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Introduction 
The existence of the internet and social media may positively impact democracy by providing 
autonomy for individuals in creating contents and getting limitless information accessible to 
anyone (Dahlberg, 2007). These recent media have also changed the direction of information 
no longer based on one-way broadcasts but occurs in various directions and various parties. 
Agenda setting and propaganda that are usually carried out based on framing of traditional 
media broadcasting can easily be unmatched by other resources in internet providing different 
perspectives that can be created by anyone   (Ardi, 2021). Internet users and any new media 
can easily find reinforcement and justification for what they personally believe and 
disseminate their views in a broader network. 
In the research of Shin & Thorson (2017) and Ardi (2019), partisan internet users were 
caught several times not doing fact-checking on news that was misleading, provocative and 
unjustified truth. They selectively only share messages that have fact-checked if the news 
only supports their candidate and demeans the opposing candidate so that the stream of facts 
has been selected and narrowed (Shin & Thorson, 2017). Garrett (2009) states that individuals 
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 Partisans are more likely to be motivated by a desire to justify their 
political opinion which is called as confirmation bias. This research 
aimed to investigate the determinant factors of confirmation bias 
among college students who actively obtained political information 
in social media. All participants were associated with a student 
organization of particular political ideologies. The determinant 
factors of confirmation bias under investigation were critical thinking, 
consisting of two dimensions—i.e., critical openness and reflective 
skepticism; authoritarian personality; collective entitlement; and 
political preference. A confirmation bias scale pertaining to media 
reporting was specifically constructed for the purpose of this study. 
The measurement of critical thinking, authoritarian personality, and 
collective entitlement utilized existing instruments. The sample in this 
study was 95 students with various political ideologies. Hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis was conducted to analyze the data. The 
current study results demonstrated that critical openness, collective 
entitlement, and authoritarian personality were predictors of 
confirmation bias. Meanwhile, reflective skepticism and political 
preference were not significant predictors. The findings could be the 
building blocks for developing an intervention to increase digital 
citizenship awareness by open-mindedness to reduce confirmation 
bias among social media users. 
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tend to be motivated by a desire to justify their political opinion while using the media. This 
motivation then leads individuals to have confirmation bias. 
Confirmation bias is seen as the tendency to support information that confirms one’s 
initial assumptions and preconceptions rather than to explore the information more 
scientifically and neutrally (Hogg & Vaughan, 2011). The investigation of confirmation bias 
in social media is motivated by the echo chamber phenomenon where social media algorithm 
directs users to reinforce their existing beliefs. This phenomenon occurs because the priority 
in search engine results and social media newsfeed is based on the user’s activities, such as 
the history of sharing, clicks, likes, comments, feeds, and searching (Bessi, 2016; Jamieson 
& Cappella, 2008; Tufekci, 2015). It is alleged to make the most of the users would be like a 
frog in a shell when one sees certain events based solely on the contents of media on the 
internet (Montag, 2019). The Internet has made individuals the central point of information 
consumption and production. On the other hand, media algorithms have also created these 
individuals, who tend to be uncritical, close-minded, authoritarian, and who perceive their 
group as superior to the others, be further trapped in their biased beliefs. 
For internet users, critical thinking has a fundamental role as an initial filter to decide 
whether or not to trust a piece of information before sharing it with more audiences. Several 
studies reported that hoaxes frequently are shared without further confirmation and reflection 
of their truth. Snowden (Kutner, 2016) explained that tackling hoaxes' spread improves 
internet users' critical thinking. Researchers from the French National Institute and Columbia 
University reported that 59 percent of all links shared in social media were never read by the 
sharer (Gabielkov et al., 2016). A survey in Indonesia also indicated that the spread of hoaxes 
was caused by a lack of reflection on the news contents before sharing them (Mastel, 2017). 
The news was assumed to represent the truth which they and their close relative endorsed. 
Mastel (2017) found that 47% of participants admitted sharing phenomenal news because 
they received them from trusted people. While 32 percent did so because they thought the 
news was beneficial, 18 percent thought the news was accurate, and the rest three percent 
shared the news because they wanted to be the first to do so. 
Critical thinking is defined as the propensity and skills to engage in activity and mental 
activity with reflective skepticism focused on deciding what to believe or do (Halonen, 1995). 
However, critical thinking is related to cognitive issues and closely associated with personal 
dispositions, namely openness to experience (Clifford, Boufal, & Kurtz, 2004). Sa, Stanovich, 
& West (1999) stated that critical thinking per se is a manifestation of cognitive ability and 
cognitive decontextualization. Cognitive ability refers to an individual’s intellectual capacity, 
while cognitive decontextualization refers to the flexibility and openness of thinking. Sosu 
(2013) divided critical thinking into two dispositional capacities: critical openness that tends 
to be actively open to new ideas and experiences, and reflective skepticism, which is one’s 
tendency to reflect on one experience. Both Sa et al. (1999) and Sosu (2013) indicated two 
essential aspects of critical thinking, namely internal capacity (e.g., IQ or reflective ability) 
and decontextualizing ability or the ability to understand the context through openness and 
new experience.  
This conceptualization differs from a definition by Watson & Glaser (1991), who divide 
critical thinking into five different dimensions: inference, recognition of assumption, 
deduction, interpretation, and evaluation. These five dimensions do not incorporate openness 
in thinking but merely address analytical thinking. There is evidence that such facets of 
critical thinking bear no association with an individual’s ability to avoid bias from selective 
exposure or confirmation bias (Ardi, 2019). Kenyon & Beaulac (2014) and Mercier & 
Sperber (2011) also state that critical thinking skill is not sufficient for debiasing to happen 
when the individual has already assumed a particular standing point. On one side, a prior 
investigation by Ardi (2019) suggested a possible negative association between open-
mindedness and confirmation bias. Therefore, warrants an exploration of a possible link 
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between critical thinking—including its analytical aspect and the open-mindedness aspect of 
it—and confirmation bias. However, Beyer (1995) asserts that critical thinking should 
encourage individuals to think in an open-minded, sceptical, and fair-minded manner and 
appreciate different stand points.  
Sa et al. (1999) showed that the individual’s critical thinking determines belief bias in 
seeing reality. It means that if one has critical thinking skills and is also open to different ideas 
and experiences, they tend to minimize belief bias. Confirmation bias itself indicates how 
individuals only prefer their own existing beliefs and ignore different perspectives (Hogg & 
Vaughan, 2011; Wason, 1960).  
Another factor related to confirmation bias, such as authoritarian personality, is of 
particular interest due to the finding of the previous study by Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas (2005). 
Authoritarian personality refers to a high degree of conformity, rigidity, and compliance to 
authorities, superiors, or particular groups and a tendency to subordinate other groups 
(Adorno et al., 1950; Hogg & Vaughan, 2011). It is typical traits of anti-democracy characters 
(Adorno et al. 1950; Hogg & Vaughan, 2011). It might be manifested in prejudice against 
different groups as well as in conservative, dogmatic, and ethnocentric attitudes.  Lavine et 
al. (2005) found that individuals who tend to be authoritarian and whose interests are 
threatened tend to engage in selective exposure to attitude-congruent information. Therefore, 
individuals with a high degree of authoritarian personality who at the same time perceive their 
interest as being threatened, will be more likely to choose news contents which support their 
belief.  
Another hypothesis related to the collective entitlement and confirmation bias was 
established based on the assumption of how entitled individuals exhibit narcissism and tend 
to be biased to respond to information. Campbell, et.al (2004) confirms entitlement itself is a 
component of narcissism. According to Campbell et al. (2004), psychological entitlement 
refers to a sense of entitlement experienced across situations. Psychological entitlement is an 
experience in which one feels being deserving and entitled. An essential aspect of 
psychological entitlement is how the individuals see themselves in a positive light (Harvey & 
Martinko, 2008; Snow, Kern, & Curlette, 2001). In order to maintain their self-image, 
individuals are often distorted by perceiving reality following their expectancies (Harvey & 
Martinko, 2008; Zuckerman, 1979).  
In this research, entitlement is not tested on the individual level but instead on the 
collective scope. Like self-esteem, which is seen as the degree to which individuals evaluate 
their self-esteem as a consequence of being a part of a particular group (Crocker & Luhtanen, 
1990), the concept of individual entitlement is assumed to be applicable in the collective 
domain. This refers to how an individual feels that their group deserves and is entitled to 
something. 
Collective narcissism leads to a siege belief system, a mental state in which individuals 
tend to distrust and have negative attitudes toward other groups (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 
2011). Such a mental state leads to a bias in responding to information. A study by Toma, 
Bry, & Butera (2013) demonstrated how individuals in competitive settings tend to regard 
information within their group as superior over those spread among other groups. It means 
that individuals who are likely to regard themselves as more deserving and entitled and are in 
a competitive situation tend to experience confirmation bias by selecting information that 
supports their group.  
Furthermore, the relationship between political preference and confirmation bias is 
based on contextual phenomena. After the 2014 presidential election, Indonesian social media 
users seemed to be divided into two entities: the pro-elected president and the pro-opposition 
side (Mietzner, 2015). The pro-president stronghold was associated with progressive 
nationalists. It was supported by secular nationalistic group and inclusive traditional Islamists. 
In contrast, the pro-opposition stronghold was associated with the conservative group 
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supported by conservative nationalist and right-winged Islamic groups (Mietzner, 2015). 
Fierce clashes in social media between the two strongholds were continued into the 2017 
election of the governor of DKI Jakarta (Lim, 2017). Scorn and hate speeches toward each 
other were demonstrated both vulgarly and emotionally by both groups in social media. The 
pro-incumbent president side would show off news from selected media that praised the 
president and mocked the opposition's weaknesses. Vice versa, the pro-opposition derided 
the president with negative contents and eulogized the leader of the opposition side by 
exhibiting positive images. Furthermore, both sides tended to ignore the validity of the 
information source when praising their political leader and to mock the other leader (Mastel, 
2017). The study by Shin & Thorson (2017) showed that partisans would only tend to choose 
news that supports their own views. However, there were assumptions from other researchers 
that supporters of conservative values were more swayed by the negativity bias (Fessler, 




Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
 
Figure 1 depicts the conceptual framework of the study reported in this article. Based 
on those prepositions, the following research question was formulated: Is there a correlation 
between political preference manifested in presidential candidates' election and confirmation 
bias (RQ1)? The following hypotheses were formulated for this study: (H1) Critical openness 
would negatively predict the tendency for confirmation bias; (H2) Reflective skepticism 
would negatively predict the tendency for confirmation bias; (H3) Authoritarian personality 
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would positively predict the tendency for confirmation bias; (H4) Collective entitlement 
would positively predict the tendency for confirmation bias. 
Method 
Participants 
The researchers obtained a list of participant candidates who actively joined ideological-
nuanced extra-campus organizations in a public university in Surabaya. Extra-campus 
organizations are student-led organizations with a particular political ideology, whether it’s 
nationalism, inclusive Islam, or conservative Islam, that stresses religious propagation.  The 
surveyor then contacted these candidates to ask for their willingness to participate in the 
current study. A total of ninety-five (95) participants took part in this research. All participants 
were a member of an ideological-nuanced extra-campus organization affiliated with a 
community organization or political party.   
Initial sample planning was calculated with a priori power analysis using G*Power 
software (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). The study by Lavine et al. (2005) 
showed that predictors of authoritarian personality explained nine percent variation in 
selective exposure (f2=.098). The effect size of their study was used as a baseline for the 
regression model built on the current study, thereby by a priori power analysis, we obtained 
a minimum sample size of 136 (f2=.098, power statistic .80, alpha .05, and 5 predictors). 
This study only had 95 participants because low enthusiasm and willingness to participate. 
Furthermore, sensitivity power analysis was conducted (α=.05, power .8, sample size 95, 
number of predictors = 5) and obtained the smallest effect size f2=.14 that the study could 
have detected. The effect size obtained from the sensitivity analysis was larger than the study 
conducted by Lavine et al. (2005), but it was considered as reasonable especially given the 
fact that the characteristic of participants in current study was more specific. Participants in 
the study of Lavine et al. (2005) only involved university students in general, however this 
study concerned to students joining organizations with political ideology.  
The participants were students of bachelor’s programs in a public university in 
Surabaya, Indonesia, aging from 18 to 24-year-old (M=20.51; SD=1.24). The gender 
proportion was 59% males and 41% females. A total of 44% of the participants reported 
spending time online more than four hours a day, 24% spared three to four hours a day, 19% 
spent two to three hours a day, while the rest spared less than two hours a day. Sixty-one 
percent reported religious nationalism as their preferred ideology, 14% preferred nationalism, 
7% wanted a religious law-based nation, 11% identified as a democrat-socialist. In 
comparison, the remaining 7% had other political preferences. A total of 37% of the students 
were for Jokowi (the incumbent president, 46 % were pro-Prabowo (the opposition), while 
the rest abstained. 
Procedures 
The data was collected in November 2017 (i.e., one year prior to the 2019 presidential 
election). The questionnaire was delivered paper-based. During the completion of the 
questionnaire, participants were assisted by a surveyor.  
The participants' recruitment was carried out purposively by providing a form of 
consent to participate in the research. The form stated that the research concerned the profile 
and activities of social media users who actively obtained political news information on their 
social media page.  
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Instruments 
Instruments in this research included the confirmation bias scale, the authoritarian personality 
scale, the critical thinking disposition scale, and the collective entitlement scale. In this case, 
participants responded to each item on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Demographic data such as age, gender, frequency of internet use was also analyzed in this 
study. Political preference was obtained by asking the participant’s preference in the 2014 
presidential election. The questionnaire was coded with the following order: 0 for those who 
didn’t vote, 1 for voting for the elected president, and 2 for those who voted for the opposition. 
During the analysis, political preference was treated as a dummy variable. Thus, the coding 
would only be based on two groups, namely, the opposition coded as 1 and 0 for preferences 
other than the opposition side.  
The confirmation bias scale was constructed for this study and consisted of five items. 
Item construction was based on the definition of confirmation bias from Hogg & Vaughan 
(2011) and the literature reviews conducted by Cappella, Kim, & Albarracin (2015), which 
state that there are motives to defend attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors when a person consumes 
media. A KMO score of .76 in this variable and the result of the Bartlett test of sphericity (χ2 
(10) = 228.52 (p <.05)) indicated that the sample was adequate to meet the requirements for 
a factor analysis. An exploratory analysis using maximum likelihood method with varimax 
orthogonal rotation (based on eigenvalues greater than one) resulted in one factor structure 
(Eigenvalue = 3.11; factor loadings = .60-.86), which explained 62.26% of the total variance. 
In other words, this scale was a unidimensional measure. The internal reliability of this scale 
was good (α = .84; 5 items). The items, along with their factor loading, can be located in 
Table 1.  
Table 1 
Factor Loading of Items in The Confirmation Bias Scale 
Critical thinking in the current study was measured using the critical thinking 
disposition scale (Sosu, 2013). This scale was adopted through forwarding translation from 
English to Indonesian without any adaptation process. There are two dimensions of critical 
thinking disposition assessed in this scale. First critical openness with reliability α=.671; and 
consists of four items; e.g., “I use more than one source to find out information for myself.”  
Second reflective skepticism with reliability α=.70; and consists of three items; e.g., “I often 
re-evaluate my experiences so that I can learn from them.” 
Authoritarian personality was measured by the modified F scale developed by Anesi 
(1997) from the authoritarian personality theory (Adorno et al. 1950; Hogg & Vaughan, 
2011). The scale was then forwarded translation from English to Indonesian without any 
adaptation process. Two expert judgments rated the appropriateness of the items with an 
Indonesian background. Through this process, only 17 items were deemed appropriate. Some 
more items were eliminated further to improve the Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient 
(Nunnally, 1978), leaving only 12 items (e.g. “obedience and respect for authority are the 
most important virtues children should learn”) in the modified version with α=.74.  
No. Item Factor 
loading 
1 I only want to read news sources that support what I already believe. .86 
2 I ignore news contents that criticize what I believe. .79 
3 I look for information that can justify what I believe. .60 
4 I interpret a particular piece of information to support what I believe. .62 
5 Information that conflicts with my belief is merely contrived information. .69 
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Collective entitlement is an individual’s tendency to perceive their group as being 
deserving and entitled. It was assessed using the collective entitlement scale adopted and 
modified from the psychological entitlement scale (Campbell et al., 2004). This scale was 
forwarded translation of the original English version into Indonesian. The modification in this 
scale was made by replacing “I” with “Our group,” e.g., “We honestly feel our group just 
more deserving than others.” The scale consists of seven items, with reliability α=.86. 
Data analysis 
The assumption test was carried out, and the result showed no multicollinearity where the 
VIF between predictors in each model ranged from 1.00 to 1.24. Also, the residual was 
normally distributed, and heteroscedasticity did not occur. There was no autocorrelation with 
the Durbin-Watson value = 1.73. Cook’s distance test also showed no substantial effect of 
one case/outlier, affecting the regression coefficient. A correlational analysis was carried out 
among the variables. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was proceeded to evaluate a 
model and test the hypotheses.  
Results 
All participants used social media to get political information. However, sixty percent of them 
had also been actively involved in discussions and comments about Indonesian political 
dynamics on social media. While 28.4 percent were rarely and very rarely involved in such 
online discussions, and the remaining 11.6 percent preferred not to say. The majority of 
participants reported that they most often discussed political issues on their friend’s social 
media wall (43.1%), followed by on a public figure’s fan page (25.3%) and a mass media’s 
fan page (25.3%). In comparison, 6.3% of participants did not answer. 
Data on confirmation bias was categorized based on a hypothetical norm. Confirmation 
bias scores were group into three categories: low (x ≤2.63), moderate (2.63< x ≤4.36), dan 
high (x> 4.36). Based on this grouping, 36 participants were identified with a high tendency 
for confirmation bias, and the other 43 participants were in the moderate group. In 
comparison, the remaining 16 participants were categorized as having a low level of 
confirmation bias tendency. 
 The result of Pearson’s correlational analysis showed that authoritarian personality, 
critical openness, and collective entitlement were correlated with confirmation bias (see Table 
2). However, reflective skepticism and political preference to the opposition were not 
correlated with confirmation bias. Additionally, significant correlations were found between 
other variables as formalized in the hypotheses. Based on the findings from hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis, it was concluded that H2 was not supported. Regarding RQ1, it 
can be concluded that there is no significant correlation between political preferences with 
confirmation bias. 
Table 2  
Correlation between Observed Variables 
 
**. Significant on .01 level (2-tailed). *. Significant on .05 level (2-tailed) 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Confirmation Bias (1) 3.84 1.28 1      
Critical Openness (2) 5.83  .72 -.21* 1     
Reflective Skepticism (3) 6.08  .71 .05     .38** 1    
Authoritarian (4) 4.78  .78     .35** .14 .20 1   
Collective Entitlement (5) 3.98 1.15     .34** .09 .12     .43** 1  
Political Preference (6)   .45  .50 .06 .02 .05 .20 .13 1 
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Table 3 shows the hierarchical multiple regression yielded that at stage one, critical 
openness contributed significantly to the regression model, F (1.93) =4.65, p< .05, R2 = .048, 
effect size f2=.05). Introducing the authoritarian personality tendency explained an additional 
15.2% variation in confirmation bias, and this change in R2 was significant (effect size f2=.17), 
F (1, 92) = 17.47, p<.01. Adding collective entitlement to the regression model explained an 
additional 5% of the variation in confirmation bias and this change in R² was significant 
(effect size f2=.05), F (1.91) = 6.04, p<.05. The most important predictor of confirmation bias 
was authoritarian personality, which uniquely explained 15.2% of confirmation bias 
variation. Together the three independent variables accounted for 25% of the variance in 
confirmation bias (effect size f2=.33). 
The third model revealed that participants with low critical openness would have a high 
tendency for confirmation bias [B = -.50, 95% CI [-.82, -.17], t (91) = -3.06, p=.003)]. 
Likewise, participants who had the tendency for authoritarian personality B = .47, 95% CI 
[.14, .80], t (91) = 2.83, p=.006) and collective entitlement [B = .27, 95% CI [.05, .49], t (91) 
= .24, p=.016)] would also show high levels of confirmation bias. Based on these findings, it 
was concluded that H1, H3, and H4 were supported. 
 
Table 3  
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Determinant Variables  
 
**. Significant on .01 level (2-tailed). *. Significant on .05 level (2-tailed) 
Discussion 
The descriptive analysis showed that 60% of participants were actively involved in the 
comment sections concerning Indonesian political issues on social media. The majority of 
participants also reported discussion and commenting on a friend’s social media wall, in the 
comment section of a mass media’s and public figure’s or politician’s fan page. Peacock & 
Leavitt (2016) explain that youths who are active on social media tend to get involved in 
political information exchange with three different types of people: 1) close others; 2) 
informed others; and 3) flexible, moderate, and calm individual. The first type refers to those 
who are known throughout one’s daily life. Relations with these people evoke comfort and 
are based on trust and respect compared to when a young individual discusses political issues 
with acquaintances or strangers. In addition, close others are unlikely to show dominance in 
discussions and debates. The second type includes those who are regarded as credible, well-
educated, and trustable. Meanwhile, the third type refers to how youths prefer to discuss 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Critical openness    
B -.38* -.48**           -.50** 
SE B  .18 .16 .16 
B 95% CI -.74, -.03           -.81, -.15           -.82, -.17 
β -.21*           -.27**           -.28** 
Authoritarian personality    
B  .64** .47** 
SE B  .15 .16 
B 95% CI  .33, .95 .14, .80 
β  .39** .28** 
Collective entitlement    
B   .27* 
SE B   .11 
B 95% CI   .05, .49 
β   .24* 
R2   .048 .20 .25 
R2 change   .048* .152** .05* 
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flexibly, moderate, and calmly without being overly passionate or overly emotional. Peacock 
& Leavitt (2016) also show how social media users tend to avoid discussion with extreme 
partisanship people. 
Participants in this study were partisans who participated in a student organization with 
a particular political ideology. The finding of the current study, along with the elaboration by 
Peacock & Leavitt (2016), provides an idea of why the majority of participants were more 
comfortable discussing political issues with their friends. Such a preference might indicate 
that individuals tend to avoid ambiguous and unpredictable situations. The political reality is 
not a single reality but is a multi-interpretation. The multi-interpretation nature of political 
reality causes ambiguity. Familiar individuals are more likely to be perceived as more readily 
predictable. Hence it minimizes ambiguity and solves subjective uncertainty (Hogg & 
Vaughan, 2011). The finding could also indicate confirmation bias symptoms where 
individuals only chose familiar friends because the chance of getting approval was more 
extensive compared to discussions with strangers on social media. Regardless of the 
descriptive data, 37.8 percent of participants had a high tendency for confirmation bias, and 
45.2 percent were identified with moderate tendency. However, it was impossible to 
determine whether or not discussion with friends had a significant role in confirmation bias 
without knowing the content and the dynamics of the discussions. 
The results indicating that critical openness, authoritarian personality, and collective 
entitlement were significantly associated with confirmation bias confirmed some of the 
hypotheses. The negative association between critical openness and confirmation bias 
demonstrated that an individual who was open to different perspectives and experiences 
would have a low tendency for confirmation bias. This finding supported Ardi (2019), who 
suggested the importance of investigating the link between open-mindedness and 
confirmation bias. It also supported an assumption by Wade (1995) that one of the functions 
of critical thinking is to take into account alternative interpretations and analyze assumptions 
and biases. This implies that individuals who dare to explore new ideas and experiences will 
be isolated and trapped in confirmation bias. 
However, reflective skepticism was not found to correlate with confirmation bias. 
Despite being a critical thinking dimension, reflective skepticism differs from critical 
openness (Sosu, 2013). Reflective skepticism concerns how individuals introspect by looking 
back at their past, while critical openness is more about openness to new ideas and 
information (Sosu, 2013). It means that reflective skepticism is more internally oriented, 
while critical openness is about exploring information beyond oneself. This finding is in line 
with Shadrikov (2013) statement that reflection is characterized in general by its orientation 
to our inner world. It is experienced with various manifestations such as emotional states and 
feelings, shame, and acts of consciousness (Shadrikov, 2013). Based on this explanation, 
individuals who have the tendency for reflective skepticism can reflect on truths merely based 
on themselves as the reference or they can also reflect on their experience by comparing it 
with others, but its orientation is still inward without openness to new experiences. These two 
strategies for reflection are assumed to underlie the non-significant correlation between 
reflective skepticism and confirmation bias. 
Further, the current study results also demonstrated that if an individual was compliant 
to authority and regarded their group as superior over others, they tended to believe in the 
truth endorsed by their own group. This result confirmed a previous study by Lavine et al. 
(2005), which revealed the association between tendency for authoritarian personality and 
confirmation bias. A similar finding was also reported by a meta-analysis by Hart et al. (2009) 
in which close-mindedness, characterized by a high tendency for authoritarianism among 
others, was positively correlated with congeniality bias. 
 Likewise, people who perceived their group as more deserving and entitled (i.e., 
collectively entitled) would ignore the truths outside their group, meaning that they assumed 
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the ingroup's pre-existing belief as to the main source of truth. Entitlement is a component of 
narcissism (Campbell et al., 2004) and may cause an individual to experience a biased 
perception of intergroup reality (Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, & Lantos, 2019). It is 
because individuals who perceive their group as superior and entitled to anything will feel 
that each of their opinions has been confirmed by their ingroup and are willing to distort the 
perception of observable facts to protect their ingroup’s claim to exceptionality (Golec de 
Zavala et al., 2019). 
However, this study shows the non-significant association between political 
preferences - which is represented based on whether the participants choose an opposition or 
not- with a confirmation bias. It can be explained by a study by Brandt, et al. (2014), which 
reported that liberals and conservatives tend to express the same level of intolerance against 
different ideologies and threatening groups. It means that individuals can still be trapped with 
their pre-assumption regardless of their political preference. There is a tendency for false-
consensus bias where individuals regard their values and behaviors as typical and normal for 
other people in the same situation (Hogg & Vaughan, 2011). A study by Sokolosi, Markowitz, 
& Bidwell (2018) showed that pluralistic ignorance effect and false consensus effect were 
more likely to happen among groups supporting or opposing a particular issue. However, 
everyone is very likely to lack access to others' cognition, so one tends to justify what their 
group believes, regardless of their ideological background. Sokolosi et al. (2018) stated that 
the root of pluralistic ignorance and false consensus bias was a disparity “between the true 
normative opinion in a group or population (i.e., what the majority of people 
actually do believe) and what individuals perceive the norm to be (i.e., what an 
individual believes others think. The tendency to perceive a consistent worldview can lead 
someone to find it hard to accept differences from outgroup, hence they keep using their pre-
existing belief in seeing the world. 
One limitation of this research was the absence of questions about the content of 
discussions and comments posted.  It is necessary to determine whether the discussions and 
comments contained debates on particular political beliefs or are rather about seeking support 
for their belief. By knowing the comments' content, the behavioral manifestation of 
confirmation bias in more distant relations and with people from different ideologies will be 
more vivid.  
Another limitation of this study was that it did not examine the external aspects causing 
individuals to have confirmation bias, such as whether the participants' social media newsfeed 
actually covered news congruent with their values. This research also used self-rating scales, 
which have their weaknesses. The observation of confirmation bias is possible by observing 
the consistency between the endorsed political ideology with the contents that the participants 
follow and share in social media. Additionally, suspicion towards and resistance against 
research were also indicated. For example, some participants thought that the research project 
had a hidden political agenda. Although it was understandable given the political situation at 
the time, this issue prevented the project from recruiting more participants. Future studies are 
expected to accommodate these limitations. 
Conclusion 
The results of the current study imply that reducing confirmation bias requires flexibility and 
open-mindedness. The results also confirm that blind obedience and excessive feelings of 
entitlement increase confirmation bias. It indicates that the ability to be open-minded is 
necessary because blind obedience to authority and excessive entitlement can only be 
questioned critically through open-minded thinking. Considering how important authoritarian 
personality is as a predictor of confirmation bias, it is recommended in further studies to 
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investigate the role of authoritarian personality as a mediator variable. The findings could be 
the building blocks for developing an intervention to increase digital citizenship awareness 
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